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IN THE SUP·REME COURr
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vs.-

ease
No. 9727

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH and STATE ROAD
COMl\'IISSION OF UTAH,
Defen.darnts.

DEFENDANT'S' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, State Road Commission of Utah, on
March 6, 1962, filed its petition with the Public Service
Commission of Utah requesting the issuance of an Order:
1. Authorizing the elimination of the grade crossing
where the Rio Grande railroad spur track crosses U. S.
Highways 50-6 in Utah County by separation of the highway and railroad grades.
~.

Authorizing the construction of an overpass over
the tracks and right of way of this spur track known as

1
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Gomex spur of the Rio Grande railroad in Utah County,

Utah.

-,

\

~·

...

3. Directing the Rio Grande Railroad Co. to pay its
commensurate share of the costs and concurrent railroad liability for the construction of this portion of
Project F-028-1, using as a criteria for establishing a
fair and equitable portion of these costs, Highway Laws
Public Law 85-767, 85th Congress dated August 27, 1958,
Title 23, Sec. 1, Chap. 1, Sec. 130 (b), which provides that
10 per cent of the total costs he assessed against the
Railroad as consideration for the benefits derived by the
Railroad.
This Public Law, supra, has been clarified by
the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Policy and Procedure memo
21-10(3) dated July 21, 1960, Par. 5h (1) (a) states
(in connection with Federal-aid Highways under
the National System) ''All crossings of railroads
and highways at grade are to be eliminated, where
there is full control of access regardless of the
volume of railway or highway traffic.''
Paragraph 5b (1) (c) states: ''A project for
the elimination of an existing intersection of a
railway and highway at grade shall be considered
of no cognizable ben,efit to the railroad and the
railroad shall not be held liable for any part of the
cost of the project, when all of the following con-ditions exist at the time the project is undertaken:
1. The project is undertaken as part of the conversion of an existing highway to a freeway with
full access." (This highway is not being constructed as a freeway.)

2. ''Freeway'' -

not applicable.
2
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3. ''The railway-highway crossing ; involv.e$
only a spur track ... ''
4. ''There is not inforce either an agreement
between the State Highway Department and the
railroad or any order rendered by the State. Pu~
lie Utilities Commission . . . providing fov th~
elimination of the railway-high'\Vay crossi,n~.''
(There is no agreement, but there is an order of
the Public Service Commission of Utah, dated
May 23, 1962.)
5. ''Automatic signal devices''-not applicable.

The above clearly sets forth that all five of the
above conditions must exist in order that there
may be no cognizable benefit to the railroad. It is
clear that in the matter a.t Bar, conditions 1, 2, 4,
and 5 do not exist. (emphasis added)
The Public Service Commission of Utah and the State
Road Commission of Utah, hereinafter referred to as
defendants, admit and agree with the Statement of
Facts set forth in plaintiff's brief, with the following
specific exceptions and additions.
The testimony at the hearing before the Public Service Commission developed a definite controversy over the
location of the 40-acre line bounding the property plaintiff allegedly conveyed to the Illinois Powder Company in
1940; the line to which plaintiff alleges its property extends at present. Testimony offered by defendant State
Road Commission of Utah that the said line was accurately located on maps furnished by the Utah Railway
Company was equally strong as that offered by plaintiff.
This indicated the line to be somewhat south of that shown
on the maps presented by plaintiff. 'l'herefore, the as sump3
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tion by plaintiff that its current maps accurately reflect
the proper location of the line is without foundation and
plaintiff's allegation as to the correct location of this
40-acre line is specifically denied. The point made by
plaintiff as to the location of this line is immaterial under
the law concerning the main issue at bar. However, the
testimony a.t (R. 65) does show that the conveyance to the
Illinois Powder Company by plaintiff conveyed all ownership to this land, except a two hundred foot (200 ft.)
right of way reserved to plaintiff.
Witness Johnson of the Bureau of Public Roads was
qualified with respect to knowledge of the Bureau of Public Roads regulations which would enable him to render
professional testimony regarding the existence of aml
interpretation of Bureau of Public Roads Policy and Procedure Memoranda. He was not called or qualified as an
expert on tract lands, ownership rights, railroad operation over a spur track, or to guess as to who might receive
benefits from an overpass built over and in the vicinity
of a disputed boundary line. His testimony that "it
seemed to him that the Powder Company might benefit''
(R. 42) is of no significance.

ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE POWER AND JURISDICTION OF THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
IS COMPREHENSIVE AND EXTENDS TO
THE APPORTIONMENT OF COSTS OF A
GRADE SEPARATION OVER THE RAIL4
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ROAD SPUR TRACK INVOLVED IN THIS
CASE AS WELL AS ANY OTHER SPUR
TRA(~K OH SEGMENT OF ANY RAILROAD.
It has been grnerally held that a railroad company
may be requirrd, without any violation of its constitutional rights to reconstruct, relocate or eliminate a highwny erossi11g, or to bear or contribute to the expense
tlwrcof; at least where such action is not arbitrary or
unreasonable. (109 ALR 769 citing dozens of eases in
support thereof.)

It is admitted that the power of the Public Serviee
Commission is derived from statute and not inherent. We
agTt'e that Subsection 2 of Section 54-4-15 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, provides for jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission over subject highway grade separations, and empowers the Public Service Commission,
wht>rt) in its judgment it would be practieal, to require a
HPparation of grades of a highway over a railroad and to
apportion the expense of such separation between the
railroad and the governmental subdivision involved.
"Sec. 54-4-15(2). The commission shall have the
exclusive power to determine and prescribe the
manner including the particular point of crossing
and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing of ...
a public road or highway by a railroad ... and to
alter or abolish any such crossing ... and to require where in its judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any such cro.ssing
. . . and to prescribe the terms upon which such
separation shall be made and the proportions in
which the e:s:pense of the alteration ar abolition of
such crossings or the separation of such grades
5
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shall be divided between the railroad ... and the
state, cormty, municipality or other public authority in interest.
"See. 54-4-15(13). Whenever the commission
shall find that public convenience and necessity
demand ·the establishment, creation or construction of a crossing of a street or highway over,
under or upon the tracks or lines of any public utility, the commission may by order, decision, rule or
decree require the establishment, construction or
creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall
thereupon become a public highway and crossing.''
It is further submitted that whether or not the plaintiff had entered into a conveyance of land and trackage
agreement, the Public Service Commission upon application of the Powder Company could, under the authority
vested in said commission under Section 54-4-11 Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, have ordered the plaintiff to provide such a spur. Moreover, Section 54-4-1 provides:
''The commission is hereby vested with the power
arnd jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every
public utility in this state ... and to do all things,
whether herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in
the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.'' (Emphasis added)
The aforementioned jurisdiction and power delegated by statute to the Public Service Commission is expanded and clarified in 54-4-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
which states with reference to apportioning of costs
that'''Whenever the commission shall find that additions, extensions, repairs or improvements to or
6
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ehanges in the existing ... facilities of any public
utility ... ought reasonably to be made, or that
nPw structures ought to be erected to promote the
s(•euritv or convenience .of its employees or the
publie ~ .. the commission shall make and serve a.n
order <lirecting that such ... structures be ereeted
in the manner and within the time specified in said
order. If any ... structures which the commission
has ordered to be erected require joint action ...
same shall be made a.t their joint cost ; .. If such
public utilities shall fail to file with the commission a statement that agreement has been made
for division or apportionment of the costs or expense of such . . . structures, the commission shall
have authority after further hearing, to make an
order fixing the proportion of such cost ... ''
The foregoing clearly shows the intent of the legislature to empower the Public Service Commission, after
fair and reasonable consideration of the facts, to apportion the costs of this over-crossing of plaintiff's operation
in any manner which appears just and equitable. Since
this Utah law considerably predates the Policy and Procedure memos of the Bureau of Public Roads, U. S ..Department of Commerce, the Public Service Commission
of Utah has had the power since the enactme~t of our
first Utah statute on this subject, and now has the power
to apportion such costs in any manner which l.s fai1~, even
if this results in requiring the plaintiff railroad to pay
100% of the cost of the overpass. The Bureau criteria
was adopted by the Public Service Commission in the
spirit of genuine consideration and fairness to the
Railroad.
7
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In one of the case~ cited in plaintiff's brief, Denver
& Rio Grande Wes:tern Ra.ilroad v. City O!nd County of
Denver, 250 U.S. 241, the court stated:
''The scope of power (of a utilities commission,
etc.) and instances of its application are shown in
the decisions sustaining regulations (a) requiring
railway companies at their own expense to abrogate grade erossings by elevating or depressing
their tracks and putting bridges or viaducts at·
public crossings, Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Duluth, 208 U.S. 583 ; Chicago Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railroad v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430, etc.;
(.b) requiring a railroad company a.t its own expense to cha:nge the location of a track and also
elevate it as a means of making travel on a highway safe, New York, ete., Railroad Co. v. Bristol,
151 U.S. 556; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v.
City of Goldsboro 232 U.S. 548; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad v. City of Minneapolis
232 U.S. 430." (Emphasis added)
Many cases involving Public Service and Public Utilities Commissions have held that the Hoard or Commission has the jurisdiction to fix the cost, (Lehigh Valley
. Railroad Co. v. Board of Public Utilities Commission., 278
U.S. 24) and they do not differentiate between a spur
track and other railroad tracks.
There are many definitions of railroads, some of
whieh appear to be constructed as a matter of convenience and interpreted likewise. Subsection (9) of Sec.
54-2-1, U.C.A., 1953, quoted in plaintiff's brief, is a definition when the section is construed as a whole, not merely
taking therefrom those words which are convenient. A
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

more adequate and pure definition may be found in
Black's TJegal Dictionary at page 1424 -

''Railroad, a road or way on which iron or steel
rails are laid for wheels to. run on, for the conveyance of heavy loa.ds in cars or carriages or carriages propelled by steam or other motive power
... incident to the possession and ownership of
which important franchises and rights affecting
the publie are attached. (Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Doering, 70 Olda. 21.)
''In a strictly accurate sense, it is a generic term,
and includes all kinds of railroads, whether street
railways, horse car lines, electric trolley lines, suburban lines, or steam railroads engaged in general
transportation. Columbia Ry., Gas and Electric
Co. D.C.S.C. 24 Fed. 2d 831.''

It would appear reasonably certain that plaintiff's
railroad and spur track would fall into one of the above
categories, particularly since Black's Law Dictionary··.
at page 1574 further defines "Spur track. A short track
leading from a line of railway and connected. with it at
one end ... Simons Brick Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
182 Cal. 230. ''
1rrespective of the conveyance of land to and the
trackage agreement with the American Cyanamid Corporation entered into by plaintiff railroad twenty years
ago, there was no testimony entered, nor is there any evidenee to the effed, that the Cyanamid. Corporation ever
intended to own or operate a railroad; apply for or secure
a franehise for such an operation, or purchase any railroad rolling equipment. Consequently, the said Cyanamid
Corporation has not secured any rights affecting the pub_;
9
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lie which plaintiff railroad has in connection with the
operation of this ·spurtra.ck to the same degree as it has
in connection with the operation of its main line.
A railroad company receives its charter and franchise subject to the implied right of the state to establish and open such streets and highways over and across
its right of way as public convenience and necessity may
from time to time require. That right on the part of the
state attaches by implication of law to the franchise of
the railroad company and imposes upon it an obligation
to construct and maintain at its own expense suitable
crossings. (SeeOhicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad
v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430, supra; People v. Williamson
County, 286 Ill. 44.)
There would appear to be no question whatsoever as
to the intent of the pertinent sections of our Utah Statutes, construed as a whole, with respect to the Public
Service Commission having complete jurisdiction and
power to investigate a situation such as the one outlined
herein, and, after a fair and impartial hearing, render
the ruling made herein in the interest of the public betterment and safety; and giving full credence to the actual
benefits to the railroad in avoiding the possible tragedies
which might occur at this grade crossing. Plaintiff's technical point with reference to the Public Service Commission.'s jurisdiction over activities which are carried on
in the public service avoids the general rule which provides in effect that should other industries locate in the
general area. in question with the growth of Utah, and
desire to use this spur track, they would be granted the

10
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right under the laws and precedents established in practically all of our states. Moreover, this private trackage
aq n~em('nt (not private track) would most likely be set
nsid(' in a court of competent jurisdiction, should the situntion warrant so doing. (Sec. 54-3-20 U.C.A.).
TPstimony to the effect that there has been no rerorded accident at this grade crossing in twenty-two years
refl<'<·ts a good record. However, there was further testimony introduced showing that while flagging and flares
mny have been adequate in the past, conditions have
<'hang-t.•d to a. point where traffic has now increased to as
mnny as -H27 vehicles per day, or an average of 2,855
pl'r day for the entire year of 1960, passing over this
crossing, many of them at a. high rate of speed. (R.
~)-10,34.)

'rhe project of overpassing plaintiff's railroad spur
track was proposed by defendant, State Road Commission, after a careful engineering study on how to most
effectively and efficiently to improve U. S. Highway
50-6; accommodate a greatly increased amount of highspeed traffic, and while so doing adopt the method which
would provide the greatest protection and safety of the
public. Testimony and exhibits were offered to show
how the road crosses the railroad track at the bottom of
a valley which enhances the danger of traffic coming down
a hill in either direction to the point of crossing. (R. 8,
Exhibit 1.)
Consideration was given to the major benefits which
would accrue to plaintiff by the elimination of a hazard
of increasing magnitude, and to other benefits accruing
11
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to plaintiff in the form of savings in time and money derived through eliminating a railroad gua.rd (R. 18), who
walks this area periodically and the work of the flagmen.
When the proposal was submitted to plaintiff, it refused
to enter into an agreement embodying a provision under
which plaintiff would contribute a small percentage of
the costs of this ,overpass project.
When the proposal was submitted to defendant, Public Service Commission, and set down for a hearing, plaintiff made no objection to the jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission knowing very well that the petition
prayed for an order requiring plaintiff to pay a percentage of the costs of the overpass, and that the Public
Service Commission acting under its statutory power had,
on previous occasions apportioned such costs.
Defendant, Public Service Commission, carefully con.sidered all of the evidence, including testimony of Mr. Jim
West, District Engineer, District No. 2, for the Utah Stat~
Highway Department. Mr. West testified that the only
alternative to constructing the overpass was the lowering
of the high places on the hig?-way on both sides of the depression, which would be excessively expensive. (R. 10)
Such a change in the road surface, particularly at the east
end, would require excavation of the highway to a depth
of twenty-five feet, mostly through solid rock formation.
The construction of the overpass will dispense with
the necessity of stopping the train before crossing the
highway, and of stationing flagmen to warn approaching
highway traffic.

12
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Defendant, Public Service Commission, having full
jurisdiction of this matter, and being fully advised in
the premises, after due and careful. consideration, and in
the spirit of fairness and reasonableness, issued its Order
n~quiring plaintiff to contribute to the cost of the construction of the overpass.
The Order of the Public Service Commission dated
~lny 23, 1962, should be affirmed by the Honorable Su-

preme Court of Utah.
U mlcr a statute providing for actions against the
~Hate Public Service Commission to set aside or modify

an order of the Commission .on the ground that it is unreasonable or unlawful, the decisions of the Commission,
while subject to review, are prima facie correct. (Hessey
v. Cap·itol Transit Co., 193 Md. 265.)

I~

In the case of Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Commission, 326 Ill. 625, the court
held:
''A railroad is a public utility, and in accepting its
franchise from the state, agrees to submit to all
burdens, conditions and regulations imposed by
the state with reference to its tracks and their intersections with highways necessary to promote
and secure safety of the traveling public.
''Reviewing courts will examine facts on which an
order of the Commerce Commission relocating a
highway at a railroad crossing is based and will
sustain such .order, if there is substantial evidence
to support it."
The great weight of authority shown in cases of a
similar nature in all jurisdictions in the United States

13
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clearly establish that the Supreme Court of the state will
uphold the ruling of Public Service and Utilities Commissions, unless such rulings are capricious, arbitrary
and unreasonable. The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title
54-7-16 states:
'' ... The review shall not be extended further than
to determine whether the commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order or decision under
review violates any right of the petitioner under
the Constitution of the United States or of the
State of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the
commission on questions of fact shall be final and
shall not be subject to review.... ''
In Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Service Commission, 99 Utah 28, and Los .Angeles & Salt Lake Ra,ilroad Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 80 Ut. 455, it was
held that the Supreme Court is bound by findings of the
commission, when there is evidence to support them, notwithstanding the wisdom of decision or whether the
court's conclusions on the evidence would have been the
same.
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission, 142 Ut. 465, it was held that the Supreme Court
will not disturb a decision of the Public Utilities Commission unless such decision is capricious or arbitrary or
is not based on sufficient competent evidence.
POINT

II.

THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
14
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WILL BENEFIT FROM THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HIGHWAY OVERPASS.
The Public Service Commission has given full and
fair consideration to all aspects of this proposed overpass.
After making an examination, hearing all testimony presented a.nd ca.refully weighing the evidence the right,
proper and equitable decision was reached that plaintiff
railroad does benefit principally by the elimination of an
pver increasing hazard. One serious accident could cost
thl' plaintiff far more money than the relatively nominal
amount which the Public Service Commission has directed
plaintiff to pa.y as a small percentage of the construction
costs of the overpass.
With the exact location of the 40-acre line admittedly
in doubt, the Public Service Commission could not determine whose land the structure would pass over, but the
point is immaterial. Likewise, it is of no effect that an
inadequate trackage agreement was entered into by the
plaintiff railroad, nor that the public will benefit by better
and safer roads. Further, the point of whether the
industry benefits by the structure is not at issue. Whether
or not the American Cyanamid Corporation owns the
trackage, a point which plaintiff persistently presses,
does not alter the fact that the Company does not own
or operate a railroad. The Corpora.ti(}n does not own
an engine and has no franchise to operate a small railroad
or any part of one. The operation, of the hauling of cars
over this spur track, which is an off-shoot of plaintiff's
main line, limited as it may be, is, without a question of
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doubt, an operation by plaintiff with ·all of its attendant
duties and responsibilities to the public.
There is nothing unusual or out of the ordinary about
this part of the plaintiff's railroad known as a spur. The
fact that there happens to he only one industry in this
particular area does not make this a unique situation nor
prove that it will always remain this way. There is nothing to indicate that the Corporation will not continue to
purchase this transportation service from the plaintiff as
it has for the past 20 years. There is, on the other hand,
positive evidence from common knowledge, of which this
Honorable Court is requested to take judicial notice,
that there is ever increasing, faster-moving traffic over
this highway. This fact alone validates the finding of the
Public Service Commission, which in its wisdom is acting strictly within its jurisdictional rights and power to
negate the possibility of tragedy at this crossing, rather
than wait until fatalities have occurred before taking the
proper action.
A railroad may be required, without any violation of
its constitutional rights, to reconstruct, relocate or eliminate a highway crossing, or to bear or to contribute to
the expense thereof. (109 ALR 660.) Also see 342 Ill. 646;
356 Ill. 501; 264 N.Y. 195; 174 N.Y. 852; 190 N. E. 896
and 190 N. E. 344.
The exercise of power by the Public Service Commission to order the separation of grades at a crossing
and apportion the costs thereof is a valid exercise of
police power by the state. A state may lawfully require
an interstate railroad to abolish at its own expense high16
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way grade crossings without rega.rd to fin.a~Y~;cial ability,
if rrasonably required by public safety without violating
the due pro<'est; of law, the commerce, or contract clauses
of the F,cdcrnl Constitution or the provision of the State
eonstitution forbidding the taking of property for public
ust' without first making compensation therefor. (Evansrille T. & T. H. R. Co. v. Gibson County Indiatn,a 199
~.J1J. 583.)

Where the Public Service Commission exercised police power to determine the necessity of a viaduct and
apportioned percentage of costs, the order of the Commission, made after full hearing, was held to he reasonable and lawful, and not in violation of any provision of
the Federal Constitution. (State ex rel Karnsas City 8. R.
Com. v. Public Service Commission, 325 Mo. 852, 30 S.W.
~d 112.
Also, where the Public Service Commission, upon
applicn tion of the State Highway Commission, ordered a
separate crossing of concrete to accommodate 2500 to
4000 ,,chicles daily, the court upheld the Commission
order; as courts have in many other cases universally
upheld the Public Service Commission orders. ( 330
J[o. i29.)
Although the actual payroll savings realized from the
time saved by the flagman and the roving guard in the
area may be relatively inconsequential (or may not he so
small, if this results in the elimination of some featherbedding) these are added benefits which do result for the
plaintiff.
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It is respectfully submittedtothelea.rned members of
this Honorable Court that while the regulation of the
Bureau of Public Roads is not a part of the substantive
law, it is one of the reasonable and fair portions of the
great body of Administrative law which has been developed in recent years, and should be given cognizance in
the interest of progress in our great State and Na.tion,
and for the protection of the public. The Public Service
Commission of Utah has displayed maximum fairness
and consideration for the plaintiff in utilizing this minimal criteria, when the power and authority of this Commission is far more extensive.
Summarization of the multitude of cases in point
clearly shows that the Public Service, Commission was
fully within its jurisdictional authority in hearing this
matter; that it has the power to order the separation of
grades at a crossing and apportion the costs thereof; and
the only cases in which the rulings of the various Commissions have not been sustained are those in which the
ruling has been clearly proven to be arbitrary, grossly
unfair and unreasonable by ordering a large amount to
be contributed, when it was shown that the project could
have been accomplished less expensively.
Defendant Road Commission has acted in accordance
with its duly constituted statutory authority; made every
effort to obtain agreement with the plaintiff prior to
bringing this matter to the proper Administrative body,
the Public Service Commission, under the statutes of
Utah.
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CONCLUSION
The Order of the Public Service Commission should
he sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON and
LEIGH H. HUNT,
Assistant Attorneys General
State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
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